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FIFTH AMENDMENT- DOUBLE JEOPARDY
United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14.
United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1.
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 97 S. Ct. 1349 (1977).
Lee v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2141 (1977).
Jeffers v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2207 (1977).
Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977).
The Supreme Court in the 1976 Term dealt
with two distinct double jeopardy issues in
deciding a series of cases interpreting the dou-
ble jeopardy clause. The Court in the first
group of cases addressed the issue of whether
the Government may try a defendant twice for
the same statutory offense. In the second group
of cases, the Court dealt with the question of
whether an individual charged with violation
of two statutory offenses could be successively
convicted of both crimes.
The issue of successive prosecutions for the
same statutory offense arose in four different
factual settings. In United States v. Sanford,1 the
Court held that the double jeopardy clause did
not prohibit a Government appeal of the dis-
missal of an indictment which followed a hung
jury. In United States v. Lee, 2 the Government
was not barred from appealing a mid-trial
dismissal which had been initiated by the de-
fendant. The Court in United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 3 held that the attachment of
jeopardy prevented a Government appeal from
a judgment of acquittal following a hung jury.
Finally in United States v. Morrison4 the Court
held that double jeopardy was not implicated
in Government appeals from post-verdict sup-
pression of evidence rulings.5
Because of the different factual circum-
stances involved in each case, it is difficult to
1 429 U.S. 14 (1976).
2 97 S. Ct. 2141 (1977).
1 97 S. Ct. 1349 (1977).
4 429 U.S. 1 (1976). Morrison was decided together
with United States v. Rose, 429 U.S. 5 (1976). The
operative facts and result in Rose were identical to
Morrison. Later in the Term, the Court decided
United States v. Kopp, 429 U.S. 121 (1976). Again,
the operative facts and result of Kopp are identical to
Morrison.
' The Court decided one additional case dealing
with the Government's right to reprosecute a defend-
ant for the same statutory offense: Finch v. United
States, 97 S. Ct. 2909 (1977). For the facts and
rationale of Finch, see note 62 infra.
reconcile the Court's rulings. However, these
cases are illustrative of several new develop-
ments in the law of double jeopardy. First,
Morrison, and Martin Linen Supply all indicate
the Court's newly settled rule that a trial judge's
finding of guilt or innocence is constitutionally
equivalent to a jury verdict. More importantly,
three of the four cases signal a new focus by
the Court in the reprosecution area. The Court
will now look less at the form of the ruling or
at the identity of the party deciding the ques-
tion of guilt, and more at the substance of the
ruling terminating the first trial. Of the four
cases, only Sanford continues to rely on the
earlier approach of creating mechanical rules
to deal with double jeopardy questions. The
result in Sanford may nevertheless be reconciled
with the new trend because of the factual
distinction that the trial judge in Sanford had
relinquished jurisdiction over the case before
the defendant received a favorable disposition.
In the second group of cases, the Court
addressed the question of whether an individ-
ual could be successively convicted of two of-
fenses for conduct arising out of the same act.
The case of Brown v. Ohio' made applicable to
the states the historic principle that an individ-
ual may not be convicted of a greater offense
after conviction of a lesser included offense, or
vice versa. 7 But at the same time, the Court in
Jeffers v. United States8 nullified the Brown rule
in part, by holding that a defendant who objects
to a Government motion to consolidate two
closely related charges waives his double jeop-
ardy rights.
6 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977).
7 This principle is based on the "same evidence"
test first stated in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108
Mass. 433, 434 (1871), and adopted by the Court in
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
8 Harris v. Oklahoma, 97 S. Ct. 2912 (1977), also
deals with the Government's right to successively
prosecute for multiple offenses arising out of the
same act. For the facts, rationale, and possibly impor-
tant implications of Harris, see note 80 infra.
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Jeffers reduced the defendant's double jeop-
ardy rights.9 Prior tojeffers, it was the duty of
the prosecutor to avoid double jeopardy prob-
lems when a defendant was charged with two
closely related offenses. But as a result of
Jeffers, the Government now has the right to
prosecute twice for the "same offense" if the
defendant objects to a consolidated trial or
succeeds in severing the charges against him,
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant
may have legitimate reasons for objecting to a
consolidated trial.
1'
I. SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME
STATUTORY OFFENSE
Prior to the 1976 Term, one common ele-
ment could be distilled from the cases in the
reprosecution area of double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy rights were not implicated until the
attachment of technical jeopardy. Technical
jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury
is sworn and empaneled, and in a bench trial
when the judge begins to hear evidence. 1 Be-
yond this common element, however, the
Court's cases were not consistent. The cases
were inconsistent because the double jeopardy
issue arose in several different factual situations
and the Court applied a separate rule to each
without considering whether the results were
reconcilable. It had been established, for in-
stance, that the Government could retry a de-
fendant after a mistrial if there was a "manifest
necessity" for the declaration of the mistrial, 2
9 97 S. Ct. 2207 (1977).
10 The double jeopardy clause protects against re-
prosecution for the same offense after a conviction
or reprosecution for the same offense after an acquit-
tal. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969). If one offense is a lesser included offense of
the other, the "same evidence" test is violated, and
the two offenses constitute the same offense for
purposes of double jeopardy. Brown v. Ohio, 97 S.
Ct. at 2226 (1977). If the defendant is successively
tried for both statutory offenses, his double jeopardy
rights are violated. Prior toJeffers, the Court permit-
ted reprosecution for the "same offense" in only one
situation: when the events necessary to complete the
greater crime had not yet occurred at the time
prosecution for the lesser offense had begun. Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912). For facts,
see note 79 infra.
1 Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
12 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579,
580 (1824). The test stated in Perez provides that a
defendant may be reprosecuted after the declaration
of a mistrial if there was a "manifest necessity" for
the declaration of the mistrial or "the ends of public
and that the Government could appeal the
dismissal of an indictment if the indictment
was dismissed prior to the start of the first trial
or subsequent to a jury verdict of guilt.1 3 But
the Government could not appeal from a di-
rected verdict,'14 retry a defendant after a jury
acquittal, 15 or appeal from the midtrial dis-
missal of an indictment. 6
justice would otherwise be defeated." Id. The current
interpretation of the Perez rule may be found in
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973). "A
trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare
a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached,
or if a verdict of conviction could be reached but
would have to be reversed on appeal due to an
obvious procedural error in the trial."
"3 Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975),
held that the Government could appeal the dismissal
of an indictment prior to the attachment ofjeopardy.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), held
that the Government could appeal a post-verdict
dismissal. The rationale of both cases is that the
double jeopardy clause is directed not at Government
appeals, but at the threat of successive prosecutions.
A successful appeal of a pre-trial dismissal would
enable the Government to try a defendant for the
first time, and not the second time. A successful
appeal of a post-verdict dismissal would reinstate the
jury verdict. Neither situation presents any threat of
a successive prosecution.
14 Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962),
held that the double jeopardy clause did not permit
a Government appeal from a directed verdict. Chief
Justice Burger in his dissent in Martin Linen Supply
Co. stated that the rationale of the Court in Fong Foo
was that had the Court permitted an appeal from a
directed verdict, the defendant would be deprived
of his right to proceed to the jury and to have the
proceedings against him ended. 97 S. Ct. at 1360 n.*
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Directed verdicts were abolished in the federal
system and were replaced by judgments of acquittal
when Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 was
enacted. Rule 29(a) now allows the granting ofjudg-
ments of acquittal prior to the submission of the case
to the jury.
'5 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), held
that a defendant may not be reprosecuted after a
jury acquittal. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100
(1904), held, on the basis of a Phillipine statute
incorporating the language of the double jeopardy
clause, that the Government could not appeal ajury
verdict of acquittal. The fact that the Government
may not retry a defendant after a jury acquittal is a
fundamental policy of the double jeopardy clause.
See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 339-43.
16 United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975),
prohibits a Government appeal if, on remand, fur-
ther proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused would be required. Lee v. United




The Court began the 1976 Term with a per
curiam double jeopardy decision which neither
clarified nor conflicted with any of these earlier
technical rules. The case did, however, clarify
earlier dictum regarding the role of the judge
as a factfinder for double jeopardy purposes.
In United States v. Morrison, 7 the Court held
that there was no distinction between a jury
verdict in a jury trial and the judge's general
finding in a bench trial.
Following a bench trial, the defendant in
Morrison was found guilty of possession of mar-
ihuana with intent to distribute.18 Before sen-
tence was imposed, the trial judge suppressed
the drug evidence on the basis of an interven-
ing Supreme Court decision limiting border
patrol searches.1 9 While the Government ap-
peal from the Morrison ruling was pending in
the court of appeals, however, the search limi-
tation was held by the Supreme Court not to
be retroactively effective. 20 The Government,
on the basis of these later decisions, moved for
summary reversal, but the court of appeals
dismissed, finding that the double jeopardy
clause would bar retrial.
2'
The Supreme Court summarily reversed.
Appeals were permitted from post-verdict dis-
missals, the Court stated, because a successful
appeal would not require further proceedings,
but would simply reinstte the jury verdict of
guilt. A Government appeal was permitted in
this case, the Court reasoned, because ajudge's
general finding of guilt is equivalent to a jury
verdict for purposes of double jeopardy. A
successful appeal would reinstate the judge's
general finding, and like the case of the jury
verdict, no further proceedings would be re-
quired .22
Morrison represents a clear affirmance of the
Court's dictum in United States v. Jenkins.' In
17 429 U.S. 1 (1976).
18 The defendant was charged with violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
," Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).
20 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975);
Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
21 429 U.S. at 1-3. Morrison was stopped at an
immigration checkpoint in Truth or Consequences,
New Mexico, and drugs were discovered in a search
of his car. Almeida-Sanchez limits the right of the
government under the fourth amendment to conduct
roving border patrol searches.
'Id. at 3-4.
420 U.S. 358 (1975).
that case, the Court held that the Government
could not appeal the dismissal of an indictment
if, on remand, further proceedings going to
the elements of the offense charged would be
required. The defendant in Jenkins had been
tried by the judge instead of a jury, but the
Court's holding applied only to the judge's role
as interpreter of the law, not to his role as
factfinder. Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court
noted the significance of the growing trend
toward the employment of bench trials in place
of jury trials, and stated that for purposes of
double jeopardy analysis there could be no
distinction between a jury verdict and a judge's
finding in a bench trial. 24 When the Court in
Morrison was confronted with the situation of
the trial judge acting as the trier of fact, it
turned the dictum of Jenkins into law.
Like Morrison, the Court's second double
jeopardy case did not conflict with prior prece-
dent. In United States v. Sanford,25 the Court
reaffirmed the rule that double jeopardy rights
are not implicated until technical jeopardy has
attached. The Court in Sanford applied the
concept of technical jeopardy to permit a Gov-
ernment appeal from an adverse ruling prior
to an anticipated second trial.
The defendant in Sanford was charged with
illegal game hunting in Yellowstone National
Park. The jury deadlocked, and a mistrial was
declared. Several months later, while the Gov-
ernment was preparing to try the defendant
again, the district court dismissed the indict-
ment, finding on the basis of evidence intro-
duced at the first trial that the Government
had consented to the defendant's allegedly ille-
gal acts.
26
The court of appeals dismissed the Govern-
ment's appeal, relying on United States v. Jen-
kins.27 It will be recalled thatJenkins held that
double jeopardy barred a Government appeal
from the dismissal of an indictment if further
adjudication of guilt would be necessary. The
Court in Jenkins distinguished that result from
the case of a mistrial, where retrial would be
permitted. The Court reasoned that the critical
24 "Since the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment nowhere distinguishes between bench
and jury trials, the principles given expression
through that Clause apply to cases tried by a judge."
Id. at 365.
429 U.S. 14 (1976).
536 F.2d 871, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1976).2 Id. at 872.
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element of the Jenkins trial proceeding was that
it terminated in the defendants favor,2 but the
Court did not state why this factor was of such
importance. In Sanford, the court of appeals
adopted this reasoning and concluded that the
proceedings had terminated in the defendant's
favor when the indictment was dismissed.
29
The Supreme Court summarily reversed. It
stated that when a mistrial is declared, the
Government has a right to retry a defendant,
and until jeopardy has attached in the second
trial, a Government appeal is permitted from
any order dismissing the indictment. The
judge's dismissal of the indictment, was for
purposes of double jeopardy analysis, similar
to a pre-trial ruling in the first trial."° Although
the Supreme Court in Sanford recognized the
vitality of the Jenkins rule, it limited the rule's
application to those cases where the original
trial judge retained jurisdiction over the par-
ties.2 1 The trial judge in Sanford had relin-
quished jurisdiction over the case when he
declared a mistrial.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sanford
rests solidly on past precedent. The purpose of
the double jeopardy clause, the Court has
stated, is to prevent successive prosecutions for
the same offense. 2 The Court, however, has
carved out an exception to this general rule in
the case of mistrials when a hung jury or
procedural unfairness in the first trial makes it
impossible to reach a verdict in the first trial or
to submit the case to the jury. It is not so much
a successive prosecution that is barred, but an
unnecessary prosecution that is prohibited.
33
429 U.S. at 16.
29 536 F.2d at 872.
30 429 U.S. at 16.
31Jenkins on its face prohibits all Government ap-
peals from the dismissal of an indictment. Appeals
are forbidden because a successful appeal would
result in the successive prosecution of the defendant.
The rationale of Serfass does not apply to this case,
see note 13 supra, because the successful appeal in
Serfass would enable the Government to try the
defendant for the first time and not the second time.
The Court, however, has recognized an exception to
the general rule that a defendant cannot be prose-
cuted twice for the same offense if the first proceed-
ing ends in a mistrial, see note 12 supra, and this
exception was applied in Sanford to permit the Gov-
ernment appeal.
2 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 342-543.
- The Court has followed this rule with but one
exception, stated in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S.
458 (1973). The Court in Somerville held that the
defendant could be retried after the prosecutor had
The jury in Sanford could not reach a verdict,
making a second trial necessary to resolve the
question of guilt or innocence. Since the indict-
ment was dismissed prior to a second trial
which the Government had a right to prose-
cute, a Government appeal from the dismissal
was allowed.
The case of United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co. 34 was the third significant double
jeopardy case considered by the Court last
term. In holding that the Government could
not appeal a judgment of acquittal following a
hung jury, the Court was at the same time
consistent with its rulings in Morrison and Rose
and apparently inconsistent with its holding in
Sanford.
The defendants in Martin Linen Supply Co.
were charged with contempt for an alleged
violation of an antitrust consent decree. The
individual defendant was acquitted, but the
jury was deadlocked ag to the guilt of the two
corporate defendants." The judge dismissed
the jury and orally declared a mistrial, but
reserved the right to consider whether a judg-
ment of acquittal should be entered. 36 The
defendants made timely motions for judgments
of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 29(c); two months later the mo-
tions were granted .37
requested a mistrial because of an incurable defect in
the indictment which would have necessitated rever-
sal on appeal if the defendant had been convicted.
The second prosecution in Somerville was unnecessary
in the sense that the defendant possibly could have
been acquitted in the first trial if the proceedings
against him had been allowed to continue. This
exception, however, does not affect the validity of
this statement for the discussion of Sanford.
34 97 S. Ct. 1349 (1977).
35 Martin Linen Supply Co. was charged with
Texas Sanitary Towel Co. and the president of both
companies, William Troy.
3 The Supreme Court's opinion does not clearly
state what occurred during the trial. A more com-
plete statement of the facts is available in the opinion
of the court of appeals at 534 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir.
1976). When the deadlocked jury returned to the
courtroom, the judge discharged the jury, and de-
clared a mistrial. After the jurors departed, the judge
stated to counsel that in his opinion this case was one
of the weakest contempt cases he had ever seen, and
he advised counsel that he would consider timely
motions for a judgment of acquittal.
37 97 S. Ct. at 1351-52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c)
provides in relevant part: "If the jury returns a
verdict of guilty or is discharged without having
returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquit-
tal may be made ......
[Vol. 68
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
When the Government appealed the ruling
under the Criminal Appeals Act, the court of
appeals dismissed, citing Jenkins.' The court
stated that the Government may not appeal, if,
on remand, further proceedings would be re-
quired to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. Granting certiorari solely to decide
whether judgments of acquittal under Rule
29(c) are appealable by the Government pur-
suant to the Criminal Appeals Act, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the court
of appeals.
The Court, compared the judgment of ac-
quittal in this case with its previous decisions
barring a Government appeal from a jury ac-
quittal and a directed verdict, 39 and found that
permitting an appeal in this case would be
consistent with these past decisions. A funda-
mental policy of the double jeopardy clause,
the Court observed, was that a jury acquittal
could not be reviewed. The acquittal in this
case was a true acquittal because it represented
"a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of
the factual elements of the offense charged.
40
The majority concluded that a directed ver-
dict, like the jury acquittal, could not be re-
viewed. The Court stated that the acquittal
8 534 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1976). 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1970), as amended by Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-644,
tit. III, § 14(a), 84 stat. 1890, provides in relevant
part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United
States shall lie to a court of appeals from a
decision, judgment, or order of a district court
dismissing an indictment or information as to
any one or more counts, except that no appeal
shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution prohibits further
prosecution.
The Government may not appeal on adverse rul-
ing in a criminal case unless authorized by statute.
See United States v Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892). First
enacted in 1907, the original Criminal Appeals Act
ch. 2564, 34 stat. 1246, allowed Government appeals
in only a limited number of circumstances. The right
to appeal was based on common law rules of pleading
like the plea in bar. The present statute was enacted
in 1971. For a discussion of the limitations and
complexities of the pre-1971 statute, see Double Jeop-
ardy and Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52
TEX. L. REv. 303, 309-11 (1974); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. at 336-37.
* United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); Fong
Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (196 ); Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). For holdings of
these cases, see notes 14-15 supra.
40 97 S. Ct. at 1355.
mechanism in Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure replaced the directed ver-
dict and only modified that prior procedure by
giving the judge greater flexibility in timing his
action.4 Because the Court could not distin-
guish the judgment of acquittal in this case
from a jury acquittal or directed verdict, a
Government appeal could not be permitted.
Justice Stevens concurred in the result. He
believed that the Criminal Appeals Act did not
authorize Government appeals from judgments
of acquittal. The language of the Act does not
mention appeals from such judgments, he
stated; nor does the legislative history indicate
that Congress intended to include appeals from
this type ofjudicial ruling within the provisions
of the Act. He therefore felt that it was not
necessary to reach the constitutional question.
42
Chief Justice Burger dissented. He asserted
that the majority's decision in Martin Linen
Supply Co. could not be distinguished from the
result in Sanford. He also argued that Fong Foo
v. United States,43 the case relied on by the
41 1d. at 1356.
42 Id. at 1357-60. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens stated that the plain words of the statute did
not authorize Government appeals from judgments
of acquittal and that there was nothing in the legisla-
tive history indicating that Congress intended a con-
trary result. For the text of the statute, see note 38
supra. Justice Stevens noted that the Senate report,
S. Rep. 91-1296 (1970), stated that the purpose of
the 1971 amendments was "to resolve serious prob-
lems that have frequently arisen with respect to the
right of the United States to appeal rulings which
terminate prosecutions other than by judgment of
acquittal." Id. at 2. The Conference Committee re-
moved the language preventing appeals from judg-
ments of acquittal and substituted the language per-
mitting an appeal from any decision dismissing an
indictment or information as long as the appeal did
not violate the double jeopardy clause. H.R. Rep.
No. 91-1768 (1970). But the Justice stated the Confer-
ence Committee did not state it intended to permit
appeals from judgments of acquittal when it removed
the language from the bill.
The bill's sponsor, the Justice continued, did not
intend to authorize such a radical change in the law
as would have occurred if judgments' of acquittal
were appealable. The bill was intended as "non-
controversial legislation which would do away with
unnecessary and perplexing jurisdictional problems
in appeals by the Government in criminal cases." 97
S. Ct. at 1359 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 116
CONG. REc. 35659 (1970) (remarks of Senator
Hsuka)).
43 369 U.S. 141 (1962). For the holding in Fong Foo
and its suggested rationale, see note 14, supra.
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majority for the proposition that Government
appeals from a directed verdict were barred,
could be readily distinguished on its facts. An
appeal is not permitted from a directed verdict,
Burger stated, because a successful appeal
would deprive the defendant of his right to
have the case settled once and for all by a jury
verdict of acquittal during the first trial. He
believed that interest was not implicated in
Martin Linen Supply Co. because the judgment
of acquittal was granted after the jury dead-
locked. The Court's argument that the judg-
ment of acquittal represented a final resolution
of the case on its facts was also misdirected, he
claimed, since a judgment of acquittal is not a
ruling on the facts, but a ruling on the law.
4 4
The Court's decision in Martin Linen Supply
Co., like its decision in Sanford, is a defensible
exposition of the double jeopardy clause
grounded on past precedent. The Court in
this case simply extended its rulings, which
had barred appeals from jury acquittals and
directed verdicts, to cover a new type of acquit-
tal-the judgment of acquittal-as applied to a
fact situation not previously addressed by the
Court. 45 The double jeopardy clause has histor-
44 97 S. Ct. at 1360 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In
deciding whether the Government may appeal an
adverse ruling or retry the defendant, the right of
the defendant to proceed to a verdict is an important
factor considered by the Court.
Retrial is not permitted after a mistrial if the case
could have been submitted to the jury. See Downum
v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (retrial barred
when a mistrial was declared due to the failure of
the prosecutor to subpoena a witness); United States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (retrial barred when
judge declared a mistrial to permit witnesses to be
advised of their right against self-incrimination).
For a good discussion of the right to proceed to a
verdict, see Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973),
where the Court, over vigorous dissent, concluded
that within the narrow facts of the case, the state's
interest in conserving its prosecutorial resources out-
weighed the defendant's right to proceed to a verdict.
The Court has not explicitly considered the right
of the defendant to proceed to a verdict in deciding
the cases governing appeals from dismissals or ac-
quittals, but the cases have been decided consistently
with this right. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332 (1975) (post-verdict ruling, appeal allowed);
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975) (mid-
trial dismissal, appeal prohibited); Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (directed verdict,
appeal prohibited); Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100 (1904) (jury verdict of acquittal, appeal
prohibited); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)
(jury verdict of acquittal, no retrial).
" The Court, prior to Martin Linen Supply Co.,
had not addressed the question of whether the Gov-
ically been directed against the threat of repros-
ecution after a finding of insufficient evidence.
The Court in Martin Linen Supply Co. extended
the doctrine which bars appeal from a finding
of insufficient evidence made prior to submis-
sion of the case to the jury or as a result of the
jury verdict itself; the doctrine now includes
the finding of insufficient evidence following
the discharge of a hung jury. This new holding
represents a difference in timing from past
decisions, but it otherwise does not differ from
prior decisions.
By extending the doctrine as it did, the Court
decided Martin Linen Supply Co. consistently
with the rationale of Morrison which was that
the trial judge's ruling on the facts should be
constitutionally equivalent to a jury verdict. If
the jury cannot reach a verdict, the trial judge,
by entering a judgment of acquittal, replaces
the jury in its role of determining guilt or
innocence. In Martin Linen Supply Co., like
Morrison, the trial judge's finding of fact has
been given constitutional significance.
Chief Justice Burger was technically correct,
insofar as a judgment of acquittal is a ruling of
law, and not a ruling on the facts-at least in
the case of a jury trial. In deciding whether a
judgment of acquittal should be entered, the
trial judge does not rule on the weight of the
evidence but rather on its sufficiency. 46 He
does not rule on whether the defendant is
guilty or innocent, but rather on whether the
evidence is sufficient for the jury to make a
decision of guilt or innocence.
But the fact that the judgment of acquittal is
a ruling of law, and not of fact, is irrelevant to
the outcome of this case. If the evidence is
insufficient to submit to the jury, the trial judge
would necessarily reach the same result if he
were acting as trier of fact. In both cases the
defendant would be innocent.
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice was not mis-
taken in his criticism that Martin Linen Supply
Co. is inconsistent with Sanford. In that case, as
in Martin Linen Supply Co., there was a judicial
determination following a hung jury that the
defendant was innocent of the offense charged.
And although the judge in Sanford dismissed
ernment could appeal ajudicial ruling entered in the
first proceeding after a mistrial had been declared.
46 United States v. Isaacs, 516 F.2d 409, 410 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 936 (1975); United States




the indictment and did not grant a judgment
of acqoiittal, the Court in Martin Linen Supply
Co. emphasized that the form of the judge's
ruling is immaterial for double jeopady pur-
poses. 47 It is the substance of the ruling that
counts.
The difference in the two decisions which
seems to explain the opposite results is that in
Sanford the indictment was dismissed prior to a
second trial; whereas in Martin Linen Supply
Co., because the trial judge reserved the right
to grant a judgment of acquittal when he de-
clared a mistrial, the granting of the judgment
of acquittal acted as the formal termination of
the first proceeding. Why this distinction
should have constitutional significance was not
clear at the time the two cases were decided. It
was subsequently clarified by the later decision
of Lee v. United States.4"
In Lee v. United States, the Court resolved a
conflict between the results in the line of cases
prohibiting retrial after the dismissal of an
indictment and the line of cases permitting
retrial after a mistrial.49 The indictment charg-
ing Lee with theft was defective on its face. It
failed to allege the specific intent required by
the statute.50 At the close of the prosecutor's
opening statement in the bench trial, defend-
ant's counsel moved to dismiss the indictment.
The judge reserved decision on the motion,
but granted it at the close of the evidence.
Under a subsequent corrected indictment Lee
was convicted of the same statutory offense?'
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction,
stating that unlike the usual mid-trial dismissal,
the proceeding in this case did not terminate
in the defendant's favor. Secondly, the Court
reasoned that if retrial would have been per-
mitted on appeal had Lee been convicted dur-
ing the first trial,5 2 it should also be permitted
47 97 S. CT. at 1354 n.9.
48 97 S. Ct. 2141 (1977).
49 See notes 13 & 16supra.
50 Lee stole two billfolds from the blind operator
of a concession stand at a United States Post Office
in Ft. Wayne, Indiana. He was charged with violation
of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §13 (1970),
and the applicable Indiana statute, IND. CoDE ANN.
§ 35-17-5-1 (Burns 1971) (repealed 1977), which pro-
vided that an individual commits theft when he
"knowingly ... obtains or exerts unauthorized con-
trol over property of the owner ... and ... intends
to deprive the owner of the benefit of the property."
97 S. Ct. at 2143 n.1 (quoting § 35-17-5-1).
, 97 $. Ct. at 2143-44.
.2 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), in
if the defendant obtains a dismissal prior to
conviction on the first trial.
53
The Supreme Court affirmed. It stated that
the action of the trial judge in this case was the
functional equivalent of a mistrial, and that
dismissals granted on grounds consistent with
reprosecution would be treated like mistrials
for double jeopardy purposes. The Court con-
cluded further that if the first proceeding is
terminated on the belief- correct or not- that
the defendant could not be convicted of the
offense charged, then an appeal or retrial
would be barred.5 4 The Court continued by
stating that retrial is permitted after a defend-
ant requests a mistrial, because the defendant
is not deprived of his right to proceed to a
verdict. Although the request for a dismissal in
this case resulted from the negligent failure of
the prosecutor to draft the indictment
properly, the Court permitted retrial since
there was no evidence of prosecutorial or judi-
cial overreaching. 55
Justice Brennan concurred in the opinion.
He stated that it would have been a different
case if the trial judge had been given sufficient
time to rule on the defendant's motion prior to
trial. If the judge had been given sufficient
time, his failure to rule on the motion would
have placed the defendant in jeopardy need-
lessly. The trial judge's action in this case was
reasonable, however, because the defendant's
motion was made at such a late point in the
proceedings that the judge did not have suffi-
dent time to rule on it prior to the attachment
ofjeopardy, nor did defendant's counsel object
to a continuance of the trial pending a ruling
on the motion.56
Justice Rehnquist also wrote a separate con-
currence, stating that he thought a precedential
addition to holding that a defendant could not be
retried after a jury acquittal, held that a defendant
could be retried after a conviction was reversed due
to a defective indictment.
53 539 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1976).
5 97 S. Ct. at 2146.
' The Court reached this conclusion by applying
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976). Dinitz
held that a defendant who requests a mistrial waives
his right to object to a retrial if tlte request was not
prompted by prosecutorial or judicial overreaching.
Since the dismissal in Lee was the functional equiva-
lent of a mistrial, and the dismissal had been re-
quested by the defendant, it was a relatively simple
matter for the Court to reach its holding by applying
Dinitz.
97 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (Brennan,J., concurring).
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foundation had been laid in United States v.
Wilson517 and United States v. Jenkins which pro-
hibited retrial after a mid-trial dismissal but
permitted reprosecution after a mistrial. This
simplistic "bright-line" analysis, he stated, was
circumvented by the Court in Martin Linen
Supply Co., a decision in which he did not
participate. There, the Court held that the
Government could not retry a defendant after
the factfinding portion of the trial had aborted
into a mistrial. Justice Rehnquist demonstrated
that he more than any other member of the
Court, clearly saw that the Court was moving
away from the "bright-line" analysis which had
clung to the security of mechanical rules based
on the timing and form of the termination of
the first proceeding. He interpreted the Martin
Linen Supply Co. rejection of Jenkins and Wilson
as the rejection of these mechanical rules used
to determine the double jeopardy question.
However, having indicated the Court's aban-
donment of the mechanical approach, Justice
Rehnquist refused to state what analysis he
believed had been substituted by the Court. In
noncommittal language he simply said that he
now felt free to reexamine the assumptions he
voiced in the majority opinion in Jenkins. He
concurred in Lee because he felt that the major-
ity had articulated a historically defensible dis-
cussion of the double jeopardy clause.58
Justice Marshall dissented. He stated that
the Court should exercise its supervisory pow-
ers and prohibit retrial when the first trial was
terminated as a result of the prosecutor's neg-
ligence.5 9
The importance of Lee in the overall scheme
of double jeopardy analysis does not lie in its
result, but in the process of reasoning em-
ployed by the Court to reach the result. The
Court in Jenkins had stated that it was of critical
importance that the proceedings had termi-
nated in the defendant's favor.60 But the case,
on its face, prohibited any Government appeal
from a midtrial dismissal. Lee limits the rule in
Jenkins to those cases where the first proceeding
terminated on the belief that the defendant
could not be convicted of the offense charged.
The limitation of Jenkins in Lee explains, but
perhaps does not justify, the opposite results
57 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
5 97 S. Ct. at 2149 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
59
1 Id. at 2149-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60 420 U.S. at 365 n.7.
of Martin Linen Supply Co. and Sanford. On the
one hand, Martin Linen Supply Co. is consistent
with the reasoning in Lee because the first
proceeding ended with the judgment of acquit-
tal, granted on the belief that the defendant
could not be convicted of the offense. In San-
ford however, the facts are distinguishable.
There, the first proceeding ended when ie
hung jury caused the declaration of a mistrial,
which, by definition, could not indicate
whether the defendant was guilty or innocent.
The first trial, therefore, ended on grounds
consistent with reprosecution.
Martin Linen Supply Co., as explained by the
reasoning in Lee, has carved out an important
exception to the general rule permitting retrial
after a mistrial. The case establishes that the
declaration of a mistrial which meets the re-
quirement of the "manifest necessity" test will
not automatically permit retrial. In the case of
a mistrial, as in the case of a dismissal, the
proceedings must end on grounds consistent
with reprosecution. If the trial judge should
declare a mistrial, but at the same time retain
jurisdiction to consider a motion for the dis-
missal of the indictment or a judgment of
acquittal, and subsequently grant one of these
motions, a Government appeal or retrial is
barred.
The reprosecution cases in the 1976 Term
have made some important changes in the
outline of double jeopardy law. The require-
ment that the defendant be in technical jeop-
ardy before he may invoke double jeopardy
rights has not changed. Double jeopardy pro-
tections may also not be invoked if there is no
threat of a successive prosecution. Thus it ap-
pears that the Government may still appeal the
post-verdict dismissal of an indictment. But in
the context of post-verdict judgments of acquit-
tal, an area not yet addressed by the Court,
predictions based on past precedent may not
be as viable. In Jenkins, the Court stated in
dictum that the Government could appeal a
post-verdict judgment of acquittal.6 1 The
strong emphasis by the Court in Morrison, and
Martin Linen Supply Co. on the importance of
the trial judge's finding of fact, however, now
leaves open the question whether the Govern-
ment may appeal such a ruling.
As stated earlier, the most important change
in the Court's thinking is the shift away from
61 Id. at 365.
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basing the availability of retrials or Government
appeals on whether the first trial ended in a
mistrial, acquittal, or dismissal. Instead the
Court is now inquiring into the reasons for the
termination of the first proceeding-permit-
ting retrial if the first proceeding terminated
on grounds consistent with reprosecution, but
barring retrial or appeal if the first proceeding
terminated on the belief that the defendant
could not be convicted of the offense as
charged.
As Justice Rehnquist may have forseen in his
concurrence in Lee, the Court's new approach
may presage further abandonment of the tech-
nical rules of the past. No longer would the
Government's right to further prosecute the
defendant be regulated at the point in the
proceedings when the Government's attempt
to convict was momentarily halted; rather, reg-
ulation would be based on the lower court's
determination that, due to the insufficiency of
the Government's case, further prosecution
would be pointless.62 Such an approach would
62 Justice Rehnquist, however, in his dissenting
opinion to Finch v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2909,
2910-12 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), explained
what he believed the new approach of the Court
should be. The Court in Finch held that the Govern-
ment may not appeal from a trial judge's determina-
tion of innocence when the parties have submitted
the case for a ruling on an agreed statement of facts.
The defendant in Finch was found standing on land
owned by the state of Montana. But his fishing lure
was found in a river reserved for use by the Crow
Indians. Had he committed an offense? The district
court, on the basis of an agreed statement of facts,
thought he had not and dismissed the information.
395 F. Supp. 205 (1975).
In a short per curiam decision, the Supreme Court
summarily concluded that jeopardy had attached
when the parties submitted the case for a ruling and
that a Government appeal was barred because the
proceedings had ended "on the ground, correct or
not, that the defendant simply [could not] be con-
victed of the offense charged." 97 S. Ct. at 2910
(quotingLee, 97 S. Ct. at 2146).
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice,
dissented. 97 S. Ct. at 2910-12 (Rehnquist,J., dissent-
ing). The Justice criticized the Court for concluding
without discussion that jeopardy had attached. He
also criticized the Court for failing to consider the
effect on double jeopardy doctrine of Martin Linen
Supply Co., Lee and United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S.
600 (1976). For the facts of Dinitz, see note 94 infra;
for its holding, see note 55 supra. Going beyond the
thesis advanced in the principal text that a defendant
may not be reprosecuted if the trial judge believes he
cannot be convicted of the offense charged, a position
supported by the majority in Finch, Justice Rehnquist
better comport with the double jeopardy
clause's purpose of preventing vexatious pros-
ecution and harassment of the defendant. But
as the Court in Sanford made clear in reaffirm-
ing the requirement of technical jeopardy, it is
not yet ready to extend this new approach to
its logical limits.
II. MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS FOR THE
SAME ACT
In the first group of cases in the 1976 Term,
the Court dealt with the issue of whether a
Government appeal or retrial would place the
defendant twice in jeopardy for the same stat-
utory offense. In Brown v. Ohio63 and Jeffers v.
United States,64 the defendants were each con-
victed of separate statutory offenses in succes-
sive trials. The issues the Court addressed in
these two cases were (1) whether the two statu-
tory offenses constituted the "same offense"
within the meaning of the double jeopardy
clause, and (2) whether the defendant, by ob-
jecting to the consolidation of charges against
him, could waive his right against successive
prosecutions for the "same offense."
Prior to the 1976 Term, the Court had ap-
plied two separate doctrines to determine
whether an individual could be successively
convicted of related charges or convicted of
related charges in one trial-the "same evi-
dence" test and the "rule of lenity." The "same
evidence" test as a doctrine of double jeopardy
prohibits successive prosecution of closely re-
lated charges if the same elements required to
prove one statutory offense are sufficient to
convict of the other. s The "rule of lenity" is a
emphasized that the recent cases demonstrate that
the Court is moving toward a balancing and fairness
test. Without stating definitively that he would hold
that a Government appeal was appropriate in this
case, Justice Rehnquist concluded by stating that he
would have set the case for oral argument.
In stating the factors to be considered in his
balancing test, Justice Rehnquist neglected to men-
tion two related principles developed by the Court in
the recent term that support its finding in Finch: (1)
a trial judge's finding of innocence should be the
constitutional equivalent of a jury acquittal and (2) a
defendant may not be reprosecuted if the first pro-
ceeding terminated on the belief that the defendant
cannot be convicted of the offense charged.
6 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977).
64 97 S. Ct. 2207 (1977).
6 The test in its present form was first stated in
Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871),
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rule of statutory construction. If Congress has
not clearly indicated an intent to punish a
defendant for two closely related offenses aris-
ing out of a single act, the Court will favor
leniency and either void the second conviction,
if the defendant was successively convicted, or
reduce the punishment if the defendant was
convicted of two offenses in a single trial.66 In
and was applied by the Court in Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), to determine if a defend-
ant could be successively convicted of two offenses.
It is commonly cited as the Blockburger "same evi-
dence" test from Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 304 (1932), and it provides that:
The applicable rule is that where the same act
or transaction constitutes a violation of two dis-
tinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied
to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not.
The title of the test does not accurately describe
how it works. The same evidence may be presented
in a particular case to prove violation of two separate
statutory offenses and both convictions may be up-
held. This occurred in Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386 (1958) (proof of the single fact that the
defendant possessed unstamped narcotics was suffi-
cent to prove the commission of two offenses). The
test is violated only if the same evidence required to
prove one crime supplies the proof required to prove
another crime. In other words, to violate the test,
one of the crimes must be a lesser included offense
of the other.
For an explanation of the test, criticism and sug-
gested alternatives, see 52 WASH. L. REv. 142, 159-
70 (1976).
66 The best statement of the "rule of lenity" is
found in Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262,
316 (1965) (footnotes omitted). The term the "rule of
lenity" is a shorthand expression for the common-
law principle that penal statutes should be strictly
construed. Under this rule:
[D]oubts concerning legislative intent should be
resolved against the creation of multiple units
of conviction. The underlying rationale is that
the legislature can clearly prescribe the punish-
ment it sees fit for any particular crime, and a
person's liberty should be "forfeited only if the
legislature has clearly indicated that it should
and only to the extent that it has plainly author-
ized."
Id. The rule has two separate branches. The first
branch prohibits multiple punishment for the same
or similar offense when Congress has not clearly
indicated an intent to punish an individual for each
discrete portion of one continuous criminal transac-
tion. This branch of the rule was applied in In re
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). A Mormon was charged
with unlawful cohabitation for conduct occurring
over a period of several months. He was subsequently
charged with adultery with the same woman on a
Brown v. Ohio67 the Court reaffirmed the consti-
tutionality of the "same evidence" test, applied
it to the states, and conferred constitutional
status to one aspect of the "rule of lenity."
Brown stole an automobile and kept it in his
possession for nine days. He was convicted of
joyriding, a misdemeanor, in the county where
he was apprehended. He was later convicted
of auto theft, a felony, in the county where the
car was first taken.'
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the
auto theft conviction, and the Ohio Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal. The appellate
court conceded that joyriding and auto theft
date one day after the alleged unlawful cohabitation
period ended. The Court reversed the adultery con-
viction.
The second branch of the rule prohibits multiple
punishment for two closely related offenses or multi-
ple convictions of a single offense for conduct arising
out of one act if Congress did not intend such
punishment. See, e.g., Heflin v. United States, 358
U.S. 415 (1959) (defendant bank robber could not be
punished for both bank robbery and receiving stolen
money); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958)
(defendant liable for one assault where single dis-
charge from a shotgun wounded two officers); Prince
v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957) (crime of entry
with intent to rob not cumulatively punishable with
the consummated robbery); Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81 (1955) (transporting more than one
woman at one time in interstate commerce constitutes
one violation of the Mann Act).
If a defendant is successively prosecuted for two
offenses in violation of the "rule of lenity," the
second conviction will be reversed. See In re Nielsen,
131 U.S. 176 (1889). If prosecution results in multiple
convictions for the same statutory offense, all convic-
tions except one will be vacated. See Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955). If the defendant is con-
victed of two related offenses for conduct arising out
of one act, the court will determine which offense
Congress intended to punish, and the other sentence,
but not conviction, will be vacated. See Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
67 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977).
68 Brown was charged with joyriding under OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 4549.04(D) (repealed 1974, current
version at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2913.03 (A) (1974
Baldwin Replacement Unit)) which provided that,
"No person shall purposefully take, operate, or keep
any motor vehicle without the consent of its owner."
He was charged with auto theft under OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 4549.04(A) (repealed 1974, current
version at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 & 2913.71
(1974 Baldwin Replacement Unit)) which provided,
"No person shall steal any motor vehicle." See Legis-
lative Service Commission Note (1973), OHIO REv.




constituted the "same offense" under the dou-
ble jeopardy clause; it stated that the elements
of proof required to convict of the two crimes
were identical except that the auto theft charge
required the additional proof of an intent to
permanently deprive the owner of his prop-
erty. The court nevertheless affirmed the con-
viction, concluding that the original taking and
the subsequent operation of the car nine days
later were two separate criminal acts.
69
The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court agreed with the state court's inter-
pretation that the two offenses constituted one
offense under the double jeopardy clause, but
disagreed with the conclusion that the defend-
ant's convictions were based on two separate
acts.
In determining that the defendant was con-
victed twice for the same offense under the
double jeopardy clause, the Court applied the
"'same evidence" test of Blockburger v. United
States,7 0 which provides that an individual may
not be convicted of two offenses if each requires
proof of a fact that the other does not.71 Since
the crime of joyriding required proof of no
fact not necessary to prove auto theft, the
defendant could only be convicted of one of-
fense. It was immaterial to the Court that the
defendant was first convicted of the lesser of-
fense and later convicted of the greater offense.
The test would also have been violated if he
had first been convicted of the greater
offense. 72 The Court concluded by observing
that if the Ohio legislature had provided that
joyriding was a separate offense for each day
the car was operated, or if the Ohio courts had
construed the statute to that effect, the Court
would have had to reconsider its decision.73
69 97 S. Ct. at 2224.
70 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
71 If a defendant is successively convicted of two
offenses violative of the "same evidence" test, the
court will vacate the second conviction. Brown, 97 S.
Ct. 2221. The test does not have constitutional status
if an individual is convicted of two closely related
offenses in one trial. The test, in the latter context,
functions as a judicial presumption under the "rule
of lenity" that Congress did not intend to punish the
defendant for both offenses. See Ianelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975). For a discussion
of the complexities of the "same evidence" test, see
note 65 supra, and for the "rule of lenity," see note
66 supra.
72 97 S. Ct. at 2227.
73 97 S. Ct. at 2227 n.8.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
concurred. They adhered to their long-held
belief that the double jeopardy clause requires
that all charges arising out of one criminal
transaction be tried in one proceeding. 74 justice
Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, dissented. The dissenters
agreed with the Court's double jeopardy analy-
sis, but asserted that the Ohio courts could
properly find that the defendant's acts were
sufficiently distinct to constitute two offenses.
75
A state court's interpretation of state statutes
is ordinarily binding on the Supreme Court.
7 6
In Brown, however, the Court disregarded the
Ohio court's interpretation that the defendant
had committed two separate criminal acts. By
stating that the defendant committed one act
and not two, the Supreme Court implicitly
conferred constitutional status to the "rule of
lenity" and applied it to the states. This rule
has been applied to determine both whether
the legislature intended to convict of two re-
lated charges arising out of one act, and
whether the legislature intended multiple con-
victions for the same statutory offense arising
out of one continuous criminal transaction .
77
In Brown, the Court determined that the de-
fendant had been engaged in one continuous
criminal transaction. It was not necessary, how-
ever, to reach the question of the legislative
intent to impose cumulative punishment for
the two closely related offenses, since the dou-
ble jeopardy clause, through the "same evi-
dence" test, barred successive conviction of
both crimes.
The "same evidence" test used in Brown had
been solidly established in the Court's prece-
dents.78 The case is novel, however, in its
application of the "rule of lenity" to the states.
The rule now has constitutional status in the
context of determining whether the legislature
74 97 S. Ct. at 2227-28 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Douglas, had earlier stated this interpretation in
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring). The Justices believed that requiring
that all charges be tried against the defendant in one
proceeding would enforce the ancient prohibition
against vexatious multiple prosecutions.
75 97 S. Ct. at 2228 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
76 See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 169 (1961).
7 For discussion of the "rule of lenity," see note
66 supra.
78 See note 65supra.
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intended to create multiple units of conviction
for one continuous criminal transaction. It re-
mains to be seen whether the Court will apply
the test when a defendant in a state case is
convicted of two closely related offenses not
violative of the "same evidence" test.
The use of the "same evidence" test to void a
second conviction for the same offense is not
without exceptions. The first exception permits
reprosecution of the greater offense when all
the events necessary for completion of the
greater crime have not taken place at the time
of the prosecution for the lesser offense.7 A
second exception arguably established by the
Court in the recent Term is that a defendant
cannot be convicted in successive trials of both
felony murder and the underlying felony, al-
though conviction of both offenses would not
violate the "same evidence" test." The third
exception was established in Jeffers v. United
79 Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49
(1912). The defendant was convicted in successive
trials of assault and battery and homicide. The victim
had not yet died at the time the assault and battery
prosecution began.
11 This proposition was possibly established in Har-
ris v. Oklahoma, 97 S. Ct. 2912 (1977), although it is
probable the Court reached this result by misconstru-
ing the opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals in the same case, 555 P.2d 76 (Okla. Crim.
1976).
In the course of an armed robbery, a confederate
of the defendant shot and killed a grocery store
clerk. The defendant was convicted of felony mur-
der. He was subsequently convicted of robbery with
firearms. The Supreme Court in a per curiam deci-
sion reversed the robbery conviction on the ground
that successive convictions of armed robbery and
felony murder would violate the double jeopardy
clause. The Court reached this result by concluding
that the Oklahoma courts require proof of the com-
pleted felony before an individual may be convicted
of felony murder. The Oklahoma court stated: "In a
felony murder case, the proof of the underlying
felony is needed to prove the intent necessary for
the felony murder conviction." 555 P.2d 76, 80-81
(Okla. Crim. 1976).
If by this statement, the state court meant that it
was necessary to prove the completion of the under-
lying felony before an individual could be convicted
of felony murder, then the underlying felony would
be a lesser offense of felony murder, and successive
prosecutions would violate the double jeopardy
clause. This was the interpretation given this state-
ment by the Supreme Court: "When, as here, convic-
tion for a greater crime, murder, cannot be had
without conviction for the lesser crime . . . the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser
crime after conviction of the greater offense." 97 S.
Ct. at 2912. But unfortunately, this is probably not
what the Oklahoma court intended this statement to
Statess which was issued the same day as Brown.
Jeffers holds that a defendant who successfully
objects to a Government motion to consolidate
closely related charges and who fails to raise
the issue that one offense may be a lesser
included offense of the other, waives his right
to object to successive prosecutions for what is
constitutionally the same offense.
Jeffers was the head of a narcotics distribu-
tion network in Gary, Indiana, known as the
"Family. ' s2 Jeffers was charged with conspiracy
to distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846" with nine other co-conspira-
tors. Additionally, he was charged with con-
ducting a continuous criminal enterprise to
distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 848.
84
mean. The statement of the state court may as easily
be read as meaning that proof of an attempt to
commit the underlying felony is required to convict
of felony murder, but proof of the completion of the
underlying felony is not required. The "same evi-
dence" test would then not be violated, because to
prove armed robbery, it is not necessary to prove a
killing, and convict of felony murder, it is not neces-
sary to prove that the underlying felony was com-
pleted, but only attempted. For an explanation of
the "same evidence" test, see note 65 supra.
The cases cited by the Oklahoma court support
the contention that the Oklahoma court did not
intend to require proof of the completion of the
underlying felony as an element of a felony murder
offense. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 530 S.W.2d 396,
400-01 (Mo. App. 1975) (cited with approval in Harris
v. State, 555 P.2d at 81 n.1) ("the offense of robbery
requires proof of a taking of property; the offense
of murder requires proof of a killing.").
81 97 S. Ct. 2207 (1977).
82 97 S. Ct. at 2210. This narcotics operation was
reported to have netted $5,000 per day.
s1 Section 846 provides:
Any person who attempts or conspires to com-
mit any offense defined in this subchapter [Con-
trol and Enforcement] is punishable by im-
prisonment or fine or both which may not
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed
for the offense, the commission of which was
the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
84 Section 848, which requires concerted action
with five or more persons, provides, in relevant part:
(a)(1). Any person who engages in a continuing
criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment which may not be less than 10
years and which may be up to life imprisonment
[and] to a fine of not more than $100,000.
(b). For purposes of subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, a person is engaged in a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise if-
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series
of violations of this subchapter...
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Jeffers was charged in separate indictments.
Prior to the conspiracy trial, the Government
made a motion to consolidate the charges.
Jeffers objected, arguing that much of the
evidence admissible against him and the other
co-defendants on the conspiracy count would
inculpate him on the continuing criminal enter-
prise charge. The district court, apparently
agreeing with Jeffers, denied the Government's
motion. Jeffers was subsequently convicted of
conspiracy.
Jeffers, prior to the continuing enterprise
trial, moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that he was being tried twice for the
same offense. The Government in response
argued that conspiracy was not a lesser in-
cluded offense of conducting a continuing
criminal enterprise. The district court agreed,
denied Jeffers' motion, and Jeffers was again
convicted."8
The court of appeals affirmed the continuing
criminal enterprise conviction. It stated that
conspiracy was a lesser included offense of
conducting a continuous criminal enterprise,
but that in the case of complex statutory crimes
such as this, the double jeopardy clause would
not bar successive prosecutions.86
(A) which are undertaken by such person
in concert with five or more other persons
with respect to whom such person occupies
a position of organizer, a supervisory posi-
tion, or any other position of management,
and
(B) from which such person obtains sub-
stantial income or resources.
(c). In the case of any sentence imposed under
this section, imposition or execution of such
sentence shall not be suspended, probation shall
not be granted, and [parole shall not be al-
lowed].
8Id. at 2211-12.
86 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976). The court con-
cluded that lanelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770
(1975), created an exception to the "same evidence"
rule in the case of complex statutory crimes.
The defendant in lanelli was charged with violation
of penal statutes almost indistinguishable from the
statutory provisions in Jeffers. He was charged with
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the general conspiracy
statute; and 18 U.S.C. § 1955, a statute making it a
crime to conduct a gambling operation with five or
more persons in violation of state law. The defendant
was convicted of both offenses in one trial, so the
double jeopardy clause was not at issue. See note 71
supra.
The Supreme Court in lanelli stated the "same
evidence" test serves as a judicial presumption of
legislative intent, and stated conviction of §§ 371
and 1955 did not violate the test. The unlawful
The Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tions, but vacated the fine imposed on the
conspiracy count. The first issue addressed in
the plurality opinion authored by Justice Black-
mun8 7 was whether successive convictions for
conspiracy and engaging in a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise violated the Blockburger "same
evidence" test. To answer this question, the
Court inquired whether conspiracy was a lesser
included offense of engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise.
The plurality stated that the legislative his-
tory indicated that Congress intended that the
"in concert" requirement in the continuing
criminal enterprise statute require proof of the
existence of a criminal agreement; therefore,
conspiracy was a lesser included offense. But
the opinion further stated that it was unneces-
sary to definitively decide the lesser offense
question because, assuming arguendo that con-
spiracy was a lesser included offense, Jeffers
had nevertheless waived his double jeopardy
rights. He did so by objecting to the Govern-
ment's motion to consolidate the charges
against him, and by failing to raise the issue
that conspiracy might be a lesser included of-
fense. The Government was thus allowed to
prosecute Jeffers successively for both offenses.
The plurality noted in addition that a waiver
would be implied if the defendant successfully
requested a severance of the charges in a joint
trial.
8 8
After disposing of Jeffers' double jeopardy
claim, the Court concluded that Congress, in
view of the comprehensive penalty structure of
the criminal enterprise statute, did not intend
cumulative punishment for the two offenses.
Employing the "rule of lenity," the Court va-
cated the fine imposed for conspiracy. 9 It was
gambling operation statute did not require proof of
an agreement, and the conspiracy statute did not
require proof of the existence of an unlawful gam-
bling operation. 420 U.S. at 785 n.17.
In light of the above, it is unclear how the court of
appeals construed lanelli to create an exception to
the "same evidence" test in the case of complex
statutory crimes. The Supreme Court in its opinion
in Jeffers and the parties in their briefs ignored the
argument of the court of appeals.
87 The opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Rehnquist and Powell.
as 97 S. Ct. at 2217-18.
89 97 S. Ct. at 2218-20. The fine was vacated under
the branch of the "rule of lenity" preventing multiple
punishment for two offenses for conduct arising out
of a single criminal transaction. See note 66 supra.
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not necessary to vacate the fifteen year prison
sentence Jeffers received for participating in a
conspiracy, because Jeffers had been sentenced
to life imprisonment without probation or pa-
role9" for engaging in the continuing criminal
enterprise.
Justice White concurred in part, agreeing
with the Government's position that conspiracy
and engaging in a continuing criminal enter-
prise were distinct offenses. He disagreed with
the plurality position that Congress did not
intend cumulative punishment for the two of-
fenses.91
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan,
Stewart and Marshall, dissented. The dissen-
ters asserted that to preserve a constitutional
right, the defendant injeffers was required to
advise the Government of the legal conse-
quences of its acts. The Government was as
responsible as the defendant for the fact that
two trials occurred. The dissenters pointed out
that the Government returned separate indict-
ments against Jeffers, decided to join him with
other defendants and tried him on lesser
charges first.92
The plurality's waiver theory in Jeffers nulli-
fies in large part the lesser included and greater
offense rule stated in Brown. To get around
Brown, the prosecutor need only obtain a joint
indictment or consolidate the charges against
the defendant. If the defendant successfully
objects, he waives his double jeopardy rights
against successive prosecutions.
The plurality's argument that Jeffers waived
his double jeopardy rights by objecting to a
consolidation of the charges against him is not
supported by precedent. 93 The Government
90 97 S. Ct. at 2213.
91 97 S. Ct. at 2220 (White, J., concurring). The
Government had argued that the "in concert" re-
quirement in the continuing criminal enterprise stat-
ute did not require proof of the existence of a
criminal agreement. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(A)
(1970), supra note 82. One ringleader could control
"five innocent dupes" who would not have the spe-
cific intent required to convict of conspiracy. 97 S.
Ct. at 2214. If the Government's argument had been
accepted by the plurality, the elements of the offenses
in Jeffers would be indistinguishable from the ele-
ments of the penal statutes in Ianelli, and the "same
evidence" test would not have been violated. See
note 86 supra.
92 97 S. Ct. at 2220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9' The plurality cited no precedent in its opinion
for its novel argument, but adopted argument ad-
vanced by the Government in its brief. See Brief of
Respondent at 32-49.
had argued in its brief that Jeffers had waived
his constitutional protection by objecting to a
consolidated trial citing United States v. Dinitz
94
for support. Dinitz held that in the absence of
judicial or prosecutorial overreaching, a de-
fendant who requests a mistrial waives his right
to object to a retrial. Like the defendant in
Dinitz, the Government reasoned that Jeffers
was solely responsible for the two trials. If he
had not objected to the consolidated trial, he
would have only been subject to one trial, and
no double issue would have arisen. 95
But Dinitz is not applicable to this case. Re-
trial is not permitted after the declaration of a
mistrial unless the jury could not reach a ver-
dict, or unless for reasons of procedural fair-
ness it is not possible to submit the case to the
jury. 96 The Court has limited the rule allowing
retrials after mistrials because to permit a
broader rule would deprive the defendant of
his right to proceed to a verdict.97 If the de-
fendant has elected to terminate the trial, the
reason for prohibiting a retrial is gone, and he
may be reprosecuted. When a defendant ob-
jects to a consolidated trial, other rights are
implicated, including the right to a fair trial.
The petitioner in Jeffers had argued that to
construe his act of objecting to consolidation as
a waiver of double jeopardy would have forced
him to make a Hobson's choice. He would
have been forced to give up one constitutional
right, his right to a fair trial, in order to
preserve another, his right against doublejeop-
ardy.S
The plurality recognized the validity of this
argument by stating there might be cases where
the defendant's right to a fair trial and his
right against double jeopardy would conflict.
However, it reasoned that it would not be
necessary to decide the issue inJeffers, because
Jeffers could easily have avoided this conflict
by requesting a severance from his co-defend-
94 424 U.S. 600 (1976). In Dinitz, one of petitioner's
co-counsel was excluded from the courtroom after
making repeated references to nonexistent evidence
and expressing personal opinions during the opening
statement. One of defendant's other co-counsel then
requested a mistrial on the ground that he was
unable to proceed with the defense. The court
granted the motion. 424 U.S. at 602-04. There was
no evidence of either prosecutorial or judicial over-
reaching in the case.
91 Brief of Respondent at 34-35.
96 See note 12 supra.
9 See note 44 supra.
99 97 S. Ct. at 2217 n.21.
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ants. a Jeffers had conceded in his reply brief
that had he been tried separately, his right to a
fair trial would not have been violated. But he
asserted that the double jeopardy problem
could have easily been solved if the Government
had requested that he be tried separately. 100
By forcing the defendant to request a sever-
ance, in order to preserve his double jeopardy
rights guaranteed by the constitution, the de-
fendant must request that he be prosecuted by
a method of trial where these rights are not
implicated. However, the dissent pointed out
that the defendant should not be blamed for
failing to request a severance because "defense
counsel- not having . . . [read] today's plural-
ity opinion-had no reason to believe he had a
duty to suggest it."101
The plurality did not explain what the result
would have been had Jeffers raised the double
jeopardy issue in his objection to the consoli-
dated trial. One possibility is that the burden
of requesting a severance from the co-defend-
ants would shift to the Government if the
defendant raised the double jeopardy issue and
the trial judge had ruled that one charge was a
lesser included offense. The dissent character-
ized the obligation of the defendant to raise
the constitutional issue as a requirement that
the defendant inform the prosecution about
the legal consequences of its act.102 In response
the plurality stated: "The right to have both
charges resolved in one proceeding, if it exists,
was petitioner's.
10' 3
Prior toJeffers, if the defendant had success-
fully objected to a Government motion to con-
solidate or had succeeded in severing the
charges against him, the Government could
not later try him for the other offense if one of
the offenses was a lesser included offense.
Jeffers shifts the risk from the Government to
the defendant to make sure double jeopardy
rights are not violated when he is charged with
two closely related offenses. 0 4 Jeffers makes it




100 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 6.
101 97 S. Ct. at 2220 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 2221.
10 3 Id. at 2218 n.22 (plurality opinion).
104 The waiver argument in Jeffers has no prece-
dential foundation. See note 93 supra. And since it is
an exception to the general rule that a defendant
cannot be successively convicted of the "same of-
fense," Brown, 97 S. Ct. 2221, prior to Jeffers the
Government could try the defendant only once if the
motion to consolidate the charges was denied.Jeffers
jeopardy rights without being aware that there
is a double jeopardy issue in his case. When
charged with closely related offenses, the de-
fendant, due to the complexities of the "same
evidence" test,10 5 cannot be certain if one of
the offenses is a lesser included offense of the
other. This problem is particularly acute when
a defendant is charged with a complex statutory
offense similar to the charge inJeffers. Defend-
ant's counsel cannot determine if one offense
is a lesser included offense of the other because
the statute may not have received judicial inter-
pretation.
Added to this uncertainty is the obligation
imposed on the defendant by the Court to
request an alternative method of trial or waive
his guaranteed rights, or the obligation to raise
the double jeopardy issue and perhaps force
the Government to select an alternate method
of trial. Because of the realities of trial strategy,
time, or expense, selection of an alternative
method of trial may not be in the defendant's
best interests. Due to these considerations, the
defendant may elect the more certain course
and object to the Government's motion or seek
to sever the charges against him; but again, he
would thereby unintentionally relinquish a
right which he was not even sure was at issue
in the case-his right to be free from double
jeopardy.
The Jeffers decision will probably not affect
the rights of a defendant tried alone on closely
related charges. If so charged, the single de-
fendant could probably not successfully object
to a Government motion to consolidate. But in
a multiple defendant trial, where evidence
against one defendant may inculpate another,
to preserve both his constitutional right to a
fair trial and his constitutional right to be free
from double jeopardy, the defendant will have
to request a severance from his co-defendants. 6
permits a defendant to be successively prosecuted
for the same offense in violation of the "same evi-
dence" test.
105 See note 65 supra. As examples of the complex-
ities of the test, the Government argued all the way
to the Supreme Court that the defendant committed
two distinct offenses, and the wording of the statutes
inJeffers is almost indistinguishable from the wording
of the statutes in lanelli, where the Court held that
the "same evidence" test was not violated. See note
91 supra.
100 The defendant in Jeffers, in his argument
against consolidation of the charges, stated that the
evidence against his co-defendants on the Sonspiracy
count would unfairly inculpate him on the continuing
1977]
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The multiple punishment cases in this last
Term have significantly changed the law. The
double jeopardy "same evidence" test has been
criminal enterprise count. 97 S. Ct. at 2212. This
problem does not exist if a defendant is tried alone
on a multiple indictment. If the charges are so closely
related as to qualify as the same offense under the
double jeopardy clause, the evidence to prove one
offense will prove the other, and the problem of
unfair prejudice will not arise.
applied to the states, and at least one aspect of
the "rule of lenity" now has constitutional di-
mensions. But in Jeffers the Court has estab-
lished that if the defendant is partly responsible
for the fact that he was successively prosecuted,
he will waive his double jeopardy rights. Only
four Justices supported the waiver theory, and
the only precedent that the Government could
cite in support of the argument was a case
readily distinguishable. The plurality waiver
theory, therefore, is ripe for reevaluation.
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